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BRIAN J. PINKOWSKI

Facilitative Government: An
Experiment in Federal Restraint
I. INTRODUCTION
In an area just north of the City of Boulder, Colorado, the
community draws its water supply from a shallow groundwater aquifer.
The aquifer is contaminated with industrial solvents and the contamination

is spreading. The Boulder County Health Department (BCHD) and the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDHPE) have

asked the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to become
involved because the County and the State do not have the resources or
legal authority to manage the cleanup or hold the responsible parties
accountable. EPA considered the request as a call for Superfund authority
to be brought to bear.'
The scenario presented by this story is familiar to those who work
in environmental law. The outcome is similarly familiar. History shows that
going through the EPA's Superfund process is likely to take 10 to 15 years
and $12 million.2 Additionally:
1. There will be an expensive groundwater investiga-tion and
monitoring plan that will take several years. The cost of

* Brian Pinkowski has a J.D. from the University of Denver and a M.S. in
Environmental Engineering from Texas A & M University. He has been awarded the Vice
President's Reinventing Government Award for his approach to environmental law
enforcement at the North Boulder site and is also the Senior Fellow for the Crossroads of
Humanity Program at the Medical University of South Carolina. He currently serves as a
project manager for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Brian has written several pieces
that address issues relating to the role of communities in developing environmental policies,
conflict management, and risk communication. Brian has testified before Congress on assessing
risks to public health and the environment. He has also been a panelist on a Public
Broadcasting System (PBS) Roundtable, entitled In Search of Purity, and two workshops for
educational television in South Carolina to discuss issues surrounding environmental cleanup.
The opinions expressed in this essay are solely those of the author and not necessarily shared
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L No. 96-510 (codified as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L No. 99-499, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 &
Supp. 11995)). CERCLA is also known as 'Superfund.'
Preparation of a National Priorities list is required in the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) under CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(A). The NPL refers to the list, compiled by the EPA
pursuant to CERCLA § 105, of uncontrolled hazardous substance releases in the U.S. that are
priorities for long-term remedial and response projects. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1993), app. B.
2. H.R. REP. No. 103-35, at 3-7 (1993).
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this effort, without negotiations and other transaction costs
accounted for will likely be $500,000 or more?
2. A series of alternative solutions will be developed. The
4 cost
of this effort will be between $50,000 and $300,000.
3. EPA will make a formal decision choosing either
groundwater treatment ($1,000,000 to $5,000,000),
institutional controls (provision of an alternative water
supply, and restricted access to the aquifer), or some
combination of an alternate water supply and cleanup.
4. EPA will demand reimbursement from all the parties who
may potentially be responsible. 6
5. Incredible expenditures of time and expensive technical
and legal resources will be made by all parties throughout
the process because of the complex and generally
adversarial nature of the Superfund process!

3. These figures are based on the experience of several project managers in EPA Region
VIII with groundwater contamination investigations. For an area as large as the N. Boulder
site, about one square mile, with an unknown number of potential sources, this cost is very
likely low.
4. EPA data for 1983-85 indicate that study costs for Colorado sites range from
$10,000-17,497. Conversations with Barry Friedman, Budget Coordinator, Superfund
Remedial Program, in Denver, Colo. (July 8, 1996). Data on the median and mean
expenditures is unavailable and not likely to be meaningful due to the variability between

projects.
5. This summary of costs and likely outcomes is based on 11 years of personal
experience as a Superfund Remedial Project Manager. The costs are not the result of careful
cost estimating procedures. Rather, these figures are 'ballpark figures," intended to provide
a reasonable understanding of what this sort of work may cost. Cost estimates for work of
this nature can vary greatly. However, these are adequate for an initial understanding of the
potential consequences.
6. CERCLA § 107(a) is directive. It states that liability shall attach and that there are
extremely limited defenses. Thus the option of the US. choosing not to pursue a liable party
is not addressed in the statute and is left to the Agency's prosecutorial discretion. However,
the Superfund is a trust fund, and the US. is the trustee, thus there are obligations to recover
for funds spent out of the fund. See, CERCLA § 107(a)-(b); see also, Brian J. Pinkowski,
Simplifing CERCLA Defenses to Liability,28 THE URBAN LAWYER 197 (1996).
7. Congress has reported that the eventual costs for site cleanup across the U.S. could
be as high as $752 billion. H.R. REP. No. 103-35, at 6-10 (1993). The breakdown of the $752
billion:
$151 Billion for Superfund sites,
$234 Billion for Resource Conservation and Recovery site,
$30 Billion for State and private programs,
$67 Billion for underground storage tanks,
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Rather than following this traditionally prolonged and expensive
approach, the EPA opted for a different solution to the groundwater
problems in Boulder, Colorado. The EPA exercised restraint in its authority
by taking the unusual step of asking the major stakeholders to step forward
and solve the problem prior to initiation of the Superfund process. The EPA
was able to implement this approach by providing incentives and a working
environment that enable the parties to resolve the problem.8

$30 Billion for Department of Defense sites,
$240 Billion for Department of Energy sites.
An additional sum not accounted for above will be the transaction costs. Transaction costs
for private property (and some federal property) may run between 25% to 88% of the
response costs listed above. See generally JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, THE INSTrT. FOR
CivILJusncE, RAND CoR., SuPFuNDANDTRANAcrO4N Cc THE EXPmECES OF iRm
AND VERY LARcE FIRMS (1992).
8. In recognition of the novelty of this approach, the people involved received VicePresident Gore's Heroes of Reinvention, Hammer Award for Reinventing Government. The
award granted by the Vice-President's office was as follows:
Reinvention of Service
Creative use of Superfund authority has facilitated community based
environmental decision-making in North Boulder, Colorado to develop a
solution to a groundwater contamination problem with minimal EPA
involvement and without Superfund listing. EPA created an environment
for local government, industry and residents to solve a local contamination
problem without reliance on the federal Superfund program. In response,
the community will have completely resolved this situation (including
construction) for $700,000, within 12 months of being contacted by EPA.
This approach may have saved this community as much as 10 years of
Superfund involvement and potentially as much as $12 Million. Further,
the approach taken at this site sets a new standard for Superfund
enforcement based on mediation skills and consensus building to allow
communities to solve their own problems, in their own manner, with EPA
support.
Cutting Red Tape
When EPA became involved at the site in North Boulder several of the
parties were entrenched in litigation about the groundwater contamination.
The Superfund team saw an opportunity to use EPA staff and authorities
to create an environment where the community, including the litigants,
could reach a solution to the groundwater problem on their own.
EPA approached the groundwater contamination issue from the
perspective of finding a way to facilitate a community-based solution.
Additional EPA goals were to minimize the use of EPA resources and to
maximize the incentives for the community to work together to solve this
problem outside of the Superfund program.
Toward that end, EPA informed the parties about the potential risks
involved in taking the status quo approach to the groundwater problem
and provided the opportunity for the community to develop a solution
prior to EPA taking any steps toward a Superfund listing. After creating
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Helping the community solve its own problems, as opposed to
usurping local authority, is a very different role for the federal government.
The role is basically a form of facilitation. The federal government's role as
a facilitator offers great potential but has not been explored elsewhere. This
essay will look at how the EPA handled this case and what factors may
make a situation amenable to federal facilitation efforts.
II. BACKGROUND9
In 1988, a man in the Crestview neighborhood in North Boulder
visited his chiropractor complaining of pain and swelling in his joints. The
this environment for the community to construct an innovative solution,
EPA took on the role of mediator for the various disputes that arose
between parties. The success of this approach has saved millions of dollars
from private and federal sources and has saved the community from being
involved in the Superfund process for the next decade.
Making Government Cost Less and Work Better
A technically sound solution to the groundwater problem in North
Boulder was developed and paid for by residents, industry, state, city, and
county governments within six months of being contacted by EPA.
Construction will be completed within 12 months of the community being
contacted by EPA. Citizen's representatives were integrally involved
throughout development of the solution.
Had EPA taken the standard approach to resolving the groundwater
contamination (studies, listing, more studies, and contentious remedy
development) or chosen to delay action, property values would have been
substantially affected for many years and economic redevelopment of this
"brownfields" area would have been deterred.
Additionally, the approach used at this site by EPA illustrates the
potential use of Superfund authority and EPA staff to facilitate private
party solutions to environmental problems without Superfund listing or the
use of administrative orders.
Reinvention of government cannot take place without the support of the
public. In this case, the responsiveness of the non-federal parties to EPA's
efforts to change the typical way of doing business was the lynchpin in
making this effort possible and successful. Accordingly, all of the
individuals named are heroes of Reinvention and should be recognized for
their efforts.
Submitted by
William Yellowtail,
Regional Administrator,
U.S.E.P.A. Region VIII.
9. The following history was developed with the help of conversations with Karen
Zulauf (attorney for the citizens in the lawsuit), Winn Franklin (resident), Jack Conway
(President of Centerline), Alan Gilbert (attorney for Centerline), and Susan Martino (Boulder
County Health Department Staff). Unless otherwise noted, all conversations took place
between December 1994 and April 15, 1995. Where possible, specific references to the
individuals responsible for the information will be made.
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chiropractor suspected that the pain might be associated with a problem in
the patient's liver.0 At the chiropractor's suggestion, the man had his
drinking water tested by a local environmental laboratory. The sampling
results indicated high levels of 1,1,2-Trichloroethane (TCA), and 1,2Dichloroethane (DCE)." The patient contacted the Boulder County Health
Department (BCHD), which then sampled the water supply wells used by
the residents. 2BCHD confirmed elevated levels of TCA and DCE in the
water supply1
The Hazardous Material and Waste Management Division of the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) was
immediately notified by BCHD. From March 1988 to March 1994, the
CDPHE and BCHD worked together to identify the source of this
contamination and to notify the affected residents in the neighborhood.13
This joint investigation resulted in the identification of a leach field
as a potential source of the groundwater contamination. Cencorp Inc.,
occupied the building using the leach field. Cencorp denied any
tenant,
responsibility for the contamination and pointed to the previous
14
Centerline Specialties, a printed circuit board manufacturer.
Cencorp was created when the one of the original owners of
Centerline Specialties left to form a separate corporation.s The management
of Cencorp was believed to have been directly involved in the operations
at Centerline which were alleged to have caused the groundwater
contamination. 6 A review of CDPHE's files revealed that Centerline had

10. Using analytical skills known only to those indoctrinated in the mysteries of the
chiropractic healing arts.
11. 1,1,2-Trichloroethane (rCA) is used primarily as a cleaning solvent. TCA is known
to cause burning of skin in humans. Animal data indicates that it may affect the liver,
kidney, and digestive tract. Some of the industries which are known to release TCA are:
timber products, plastic, and laundries (dry cleaners).
1,2-Dichloroethane (DCE) is used primarily to make vinyl chloride and other
solvents that remove grease, glue, and dirt. DCE is also used to remove the lead from leaded
gasoline. DCE may reasonably be anticipated to be a carcinogen. Both humans and animals
have died from lung and heart failure after breathing, eating, or drinking large amounts of
DCE.
12. Letter from David C. Shelton, Director, Hazardous Materials & Waste Management
Division, Colo. Dep't of Health, U.S. EPA., to Bob Duprey, Director, Hazardous Waste
Management Division of EPA (March 21,1994) (on file with author).
13. id.
14. Id.
15. Centerline Specialties is a printed circuit board manufacturer. In 1979, Centerline
Specialties moved to Longmont, Colo., and changed its name to Centerline Circuits. It will
be referred to as Centerline throughout the remainder of this essay.
16. Conversations with Jack Conway, Pres. of Centerline Circuits, Inc., & Alan Gilbert,
attorney at Sherman & Howard, L.L.P., in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 15-20,1994).
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used DCE, TCA and other chlorinated solvents at its operation in North
Boulder.17
Centerline voluntarily implemented a sampling program to
characterize groundwater quality at the facility upon being contacted by
CDHPE. Centerline also voluntarily supplied bottled drinking water to all
residents with contaminated wells.1 8
Concurrent with the groundwater investigation, BCHD asked the
City of Boulder to investigate the feasibility of providing water service to
residences within the impacted neighborhood. 9 The City of Boulder
Department of Public Works met with both the BCHD and Centerline to
evaluate this alternative." At that time, Centerline had proposed to pay 50
percent of the cost to design and install a water main through the area.'
Centerline also offered to pay the entire amount of the cost to connect
individual properties whose wells exceeded the DCE standards to this
water supply service.' These offers were later withdrawn after the
community, 105 individuals, filed suit against Cencorp and Centerline.'
Further, on December 23,1993, Centerline Circuits notified CDPHE
that they would no longer collect water samples from the affected
neighborhood.2 ' These decisions were based on their desire to conserve
resources to defend the lawsuit filed against them by the Crestview
neighbors. 5
CDHPE did not have authority under existing State laws to require
Centerline to do further investigative work at the facility and did not have
the resources to undertake the work itself.' In such instances it is common
for states to request assistance from EPA.
EPA has great authority to act and order private parties to act
under the Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) where there has been a release of a
hazardous substance into the environment. 7 Congress passed the Super-

17. Supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Telephone conversations with Susan Martino, Public Health Inspector, Boulder City
Health Dept. (Nov. 15,1994).
20. Conversations with Stan Zemler, City of Boulder, in Boulder, Colo. (Dec. 8,1994).
21. Supra, note 16.
22. Id.
23. Letter from Alan J.Gilbert, Sherman & Howard, to Walter Avramenko, Corrective
Action Unit Leader, Monitoring & Enforcement Section, Hazardous Waste Control Program,
Colorado Department of Health (December 23,1993) (on file with author).
24. Id.
25. Supra, note 16.
26. Supranote 12.
27. CERCLA, supra note 1.
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fund law to address inactive or abandoned hazardous waste facilities. 2
Congress intended to encourage parties to focus on cleanup?9 Toward that
end, liability under the statute is considered to be strict, joint and several,
and retroactive, thus minimizing the initial series of arguments about who
actually caused hazardous wastes to be released. 30

28. H.R. REP. No. 103-35, at 3 (1993).
29. Id.
30. Once the parties have assured themselves that liability is strict under the case law,
they frequently realize that their efforts may be better spent resolving the contamination
issue rather than fighting with EPA. See generally United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436
(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992);
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
1192 (2d Cir. 1992); 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355,1357 (9th
Cir. 1990) (CERCLA "generally imposes strict liability on owners and operators of facilities
at which hazardous substances were disposed'); United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24
(1st Cir. 1990); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)
("CERCLA contemplates strict liability for landowners"); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882
F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989); United States. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841
F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga.
1993); United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 89-2124, slip op. (W.D. Pa. July 5,1991)
(available on LEXIS at 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15229 and Westlaw 1991 WL 333694); United
States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 755 F.
Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), modified by 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); Weigmann & Rose
International Corp. v. NL Industries, 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990); United States v.
Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1989); B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn.
1988); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988) (no showing of
negligence required); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va.
1988); United States v. Serafini,706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Anheuser-Busch Co., Inc.
v. Charles Todd Corp., No. 85-236C, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4,1987) (available on LEXIS at
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15320); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump, Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285
(D. Minn. 1987); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mo. 1987); United States v.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); In re Hemingway Transport Inc., 73 B.R. 494
(May 8,1987); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987),
affd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1988); Sunnen Products Co. v. Chemtech Indus.,
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Miami Drum Services, Inc., 25 Env't
Rep. Cas. 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. 1897 (E.D. Pa.
1986); United States v. Medley, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. 1315 (D.S.C. 1986); Violet v. Picillo, 648
F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986); Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., No. 83-2670, slip
op. (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16,1986) (PR's lack of knowledge that fill contained dioxin not relevant
in view of strict liability); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Ward, 618 F.
Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1986); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); United States v.
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Accordingly, on March 21,1994, CDHPE and BCDH both requested
assistance from EPA. 1 Specifically, they asked EPA to perform the
following list of activities:
1. Sample the drinking water supplies for all residents within
the plume boundaries (approximately 200 properties).
"Sampling should be performed four times per year and
should be designed to track the eventual spread and
migration of the groundwater contamination." 2
2. Complete a door-to-door survey of the homes in the area
to identify all registered and any potentially unidentified
drinking water wells.'
3. Sample the local creek that runs through the contamination
plume and a marsh area near the elementary school.
Evaluate the potential exposure of children to
contaminated water from these areas. 4
4. Characterize subsurface geology and hydrogeology to
determine the fate and transport of the contaminant plume
and the possibility of additional down gradient contamina-

tion

s

5. Sample indoor air to determine the risk that residents may
be inhaling VOCs while showering and cooking.'
The CDHPE's request was extensive and would have involved a
substantial time and resource commitment by the EPA. The EPA agreed to
look into the matter but did not agree to satisfy CDHPE's extensive

Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd

in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v.
Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 1354 (D.N.M. 1984); see also United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (-CERCLA holds the owner or operator of a facility ...
strictly liable'). But see United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd on other
grounds, 713 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1983).
31. See supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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request.37 The EPA analyzed the data provided by the State and sent out a
sampling team. The EPA also began communications with the BCHD staff
to develop the background for this case.m
North Boulder has a history of light industrial and commercial uses
such as auto and body shops, fabrication plants, silk screen shops, etc.
North Boulder also includes the Fire Training Center, which is utilized by
numerous municipal fire departments; a Colorado Department of
Transportation maintenance facility, which has been in existence for almost
40 years; and a county vehicle maintenance facility.39
The residences and commercial properties in North Boulder rely on
septic systems to manage their wastewater.' Based on conversations with
staff at the Boulder County Health Department, EPA determined that it was
likely that septic systems throughout the area were contributing to
groundwater contamination.41 EPA's efforts to map the groundwater
contamination furthered this suspicion.4
The difficulties posed by the number of potential contamination
sources were increased by the social characteristics of the residential
community. This area of Boulder is comprised of large parcels of land with
many of the residents keeping horses and other farm animals on their
properties. The area covers approximately one square mile and includes as
many as 400 residents. The residents of this area have historically resisted
annexation efforts by the City of Boulder partly because they are
dissatisfied with the development plans of the city. Also, they don't want
to pay additional taxes; they don't want to pay the fees associated with
annexation; and lastly, they don't like the city.4 Folks out west are
sometimes like that.
The City of Boulder had been working with the County and citizens
in North Boulder area since 1992 on a North Boulder Subcommunity Plan
that included annexation for the affected area. Annexation of the area
would allow the residents to have access to an uncontaminated drinking
water supply. In fact, the City Planning Department had gone before the
City Council to investigate the possibility of bringing this area into the City

37. Letter from Robert L. Duprey, Director, Hazardous Waste Management Division,
U.S.E.P.A., Region VIII, to Howard Roitma, Acting Director Hazardous Materials and
Waste Management Division, Colorado Department of Health (now known as Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment) (June 10,1994) (on file with author).
38. Id.
39. See supranote 19.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Preliminary Assessment, Centerline Circuits. Boulder, Boulder Cty, Colo. Dec. 30,
1993. TDD #T08-9308-504.
43. Telephone conversations with Karen Zulauf, attorney for residents (Jan.13,1995).
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early due to the groundwater contamination. The City Council decided that
they would not supply water to this area until this enclave of people agreed
to be annexed into the City. The rationale of the City Council was that City
Services should be for those who pay City taxes."
Despite the local politics of the annexation issue, City Staff and
several of the residents believed that annexation was only a matter of a few
years away.' The area was nearly surrounded by City property and was
substantially supported by City Services such as bus routes and parks. From
the City's perspective, this neighborhood was already benefiting from being
part of the City, but without paying for services. 6
III. COMMUNITY NEEDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
Before proceeding to describing the EPA's actions in this
community it is important to spend some time attempting to understand the
conflicts that occur when environmental cleanup issues arise in a
community. Many of these conflicts were identified during a series of panel
discussions that took place at the Medical University of South Carolina. The
author had the opportunity to participate in these panel discussions and
saw in them the basis for guidelines for federal interactions with
communities.4 7 The guidelines developed by EPA's participation in these
panel discussions were the underlying basis for EPA strategy on the North
Boulder site.
a. "In Search of Purity"
In June 1993, the Environmental Hazards Assessment Program of
the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) assembled 15 individuals
with demonstrated experience with the problems posed by hazardous
wastes, public health, and the roles of government and communities in
solving these problems.' The purpose of this panel was to provide an open
forum to expose the underlying interests at the heart of conflicts that arise

44. See supra note 20.
45. Conversations with Stan Zemler and Leslie Lacy, Boulder Cty. Attorney's Office, in
Boulder, Colo.(January, 5 1995).
46. See supra note 20.
47. EPA Region VIll Management concurred. Conversation with Bob DuPrey in Denver,

Colo.(Nov. 21,1994).
48. Videotape: In Search Of Purity (The Medical University of South Carolina,
Environmental Hazards Assessment Program, Crossroads of Humanity Series; PBS Round
Table discussion produced by Fred Friendly Productions 1993) (on file with author).
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at hazardous waste sites.49 The method chosen by MUSC to guide the panel
through the exploration of these issues was a role playing exercise in a
hypothetical community.
The moderator, Charles Nesson from Harvard Law School, placed
the panelist in the fictional town of Purity at a town picnic celebrating the
opening of the "East End Library." A fictional character approaches one of
the panelists and reminisces about how the East End used to be the town
dump. The panelist assumes the role of a local housewife and mother,
pointing out that her kids had come back from the woods by the old dump
with "melted" tennis shoes.
The response of the city officials on the panel was to try to keep the
community "from overreacting" until they could find out what was "really"
going on. There was also a brief discussion of whether or not the city should
keep any of its findings secret from the public and how to minimize press
reaction. Two of the panelists reacted adversely to the notion of government
"managing" public fears and concerns. They concluded, "the only way
49. The MUSC panel was composed of the following individuals:
Dean L. Buntrock is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
WMX Technologies, Inc. (formerly Waste Management, Inc.), Oak Brook,
Ill.
Brian Costner is Director of the Energy Research Foundation.
Caron Chess is Director of the Center for Environmental Communication
at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. She also serves on the National
Research Council's Board on Radioactive Waste.
Arnold Diaz is an investigative reporter for WCBS-TV, New York, N.Y.
Tom Fink, J.D., Mayor of Anchorage, Alaska.
Ruth M. Heifetz, M.D. & M.P.H., Senior Lecturer in the Department of
Community & Family Medicine, University of California, San Diego School
of Medicine.
Marilyn Leistner served as Mayor of Times Beach, Missouri.
James A. McClure, J.D., served 24 years in the United States Congress,
Idaho.
Alan Moghissi, Ph.D.
Brian J. Pinkowski, M.S.C.E., J.D., Superfund Remedial Project manager for
the U.S. EPA, Denver, Colo.
Michael J. Pompili serves as Assistant Health Commissioner
(Environmental Health) for the Columbus Health Department in Ohio.
Ellen K. Silbergeld, Ph.D., professor, Dep't of Epidemiology & Preventive
Medicine, University of Maryland.
Rena 1.Steizor, J.D., partner, Speigel & McDiarmid (law firm), Washington,
D.C.
Lee M. Thomas, former EPA Administrator from 1985-1989, Senior Vice
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government will listen to us is when we involve the press." Thus, the
tensions escalated as media representatives discussed the "angles" they
would use to portray the story.
When asked if EPA should come out to investigate the source of the
community concern and press attention, a former U.S. Senator became
frustrated and declared that it is unreasonable to send people out to
investigate every rumor, particularly a story such as this "which is
ridiculous on its face."
When a former EPA administrator was asked how EPA would
react, he answered that there would be no reaction from the federal
government unless the state agency was inappropriately ignoring the
situation. An EPA project manager on the panel disagreed, and pointed out
that the local EPA office must be more sensitive to community issues than
EPA headquarters back in Washington D.C. and that the local EPA office
would probably look into it.?'
An academician/consultant claimed that everyone was failing to
handle this situation properly because no one had consulted him. In his
view, use of a technical expert that relies on scientific, peer reviewed studies
to conclude whether there may be a problem would be the only rational
course of action.
There were a few more arguments about whether an environmental
problem was actually present in this community. However, ultimately, this
panel discussion devolved into a series of conflicts over the ability of the
local government to handle this situation and whether the federal
government should become involved. The entire panel discussion can easily
be summarized as the realistic portrayal of the lack of coordination and
competing views of how to proceed on a hazardous waste issue. But that is
merely the beginning of a hazardous waste project.
b. "Purity Revisited"
MUSC was a little surprised by the outcome of the first panel
discussion. They hadn't expected conflict to arise so early in the process of
addressing an environmental issue. Because MUSC was interested in the
more widely known conflicts surrounding remedy selection they held
another panel, "Purity Revisited," and moved the hypothetical forward in
time.5 ' In the updated scenario several studies had been conducted, a fence

50. The author.
51. Videotape: Purity Revisited (The Medical University of South Carolina,
Environmental Hazards Assessment Program, Crossroads of Humanity Series, PBS Round
Table discussion produced by Fred Friendly Productions 1993) (on file with author).
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had been placed around the area and the federal government, through EPA,
had become involved.
Nesson asked the Mayor of Purity whether the site should be on the
National Priority List (NPL). The mayor responded that the site should not
be placed on the NPL because doing so will remove the site from local
influence and the town will "lose its voice." An EPA attorney on the panel
confirmed that the Mayor's statement was true to the extent that the
authority for site decisions rested with the EPA under federal law once the
site is placed on the NPL.
Business leaders on the panel claimed that placing the site on the
NPL provided responsibility for business to handle and pay for the
situation but no real input into the resolution. Both business and city
officials wanted to keep the federal government out because they feared the
project would be removed from local control.
In response, a state agency representative on the panel attempted
to point out that there was plenty of room for input in the Superfund
process through the required public comment periods, but was interrupted
by one of the business leaders who stated that this was not the kind of input
they want. They wanted up front input, not reactive input after the
government had made up its mind.
The state agency representative pointed out that the town and the
business likely do not have sufficient funds to do the work themselves and
have to live with the involvement of the feds and the state if they want the
cleanup to be performed.
The EPA attorney then made the relationship between EPA and the
locals more clear: "Like it or not, we're your government. Someone has to
make decisions for this site and we have the authority and funding." The
mayor responded angrily, stating that this was exactly the approach that
removed any notions of partnership. "[We] can do all the work, but EPA
makes the final decision." The state agency representative pointed out that
the site had been there for 20 years and no progress had been made until
EPA became involved.
The moderator then moved the setting forward in time to the point
of remedy selection. He provided facts that indicated that the best technical
decision for the site would be onsite incineration of the contaminated soils.
The hypothetical "science" provided was that there would be no residual
products coming out of the smokestack. Incineration would work here
better than anywhere else on the planet. With these "facts," Nesson asked
about the 30 to 60-day comment period that EPA provides to gather input
from the community.
The community representatives declared that, "It doesn't sound
like EPA really wants to know what the public wants." Amusingly, EPA
confirmed and denied this at the same time by saying that unless someone
comes forward with dramatically different and unexpected information,
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there would be no change of the decision to use incineration. But he assured
the panel that EPA was committed to spending a great deal of time after the
formal decision trying to educate the community about how incineration
works and the safety factors involved.
The mayor claimed that this input, like the rest, would be
superficial and "after the fact." The community representatives agreed and
declared that it would be time to chain themselves to EPA's door if the
community wishes were not taken seriously.
The EPA attorney explained that EPA is required to find the most
permanent remedy and incineration is the most permanent remedy
available for this project. However, as he backpedaled, he conceded that
EPA would have to come up with another remedy if the community would
not allow incineration to proceed5 2 After he rationalized the decision to do
what the community originally wanted, the residents and elected officials
accused EPA of being uncommitted to its own ideals.
c. Analysis of Purity
The apparent collapse of these two panel discussions revealed
several important messages from the public:
1. Communities need help in the form of technical assistance,
financial assistance, and leadership to precipitate activity
at sites;
2. Local governments need help in the form of legal authority
to involve the appropriate parties, technical expertise,
financial assistance, and credibility with the community,
and gentle leadership to initiate actions at waste sites
without supplanting local autonomy;
3. The federal government is obliged to make sure that a
minimum level of health is maintained nationally and that
citizens have an opportunity for involvement in the
solution to these issues.'
Given these interests, the federal government traditionally steps in
to resolve the issue itself. The federal government can provide the authority,
leadership, technical expertise, and financial wherewithal to resolve

52. The author has personally had the pleasure of backpedaling in the face of
community upset on several occasions. It comes with the job.
53. It is ironic that the citizens see the government process as excluding citizens, while
the feds view their role as protecting citizens' rights.
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environmental issues. Hence the joke: "I'm from the government and rm
here to help." However, when EPA assumes this type of leadership role in
a community, the problems revealed in the panel discussions are repeated
and the resolution of the environmental problem is bogged down in conflict
resulting from the actual or perceived federal usurpation of local authority.
IV. THE CHALLENGE TO THE PARTIES IN NORTH BOULDER
EPA's Denver office took the lessons from the MUSC panels to
heart. The Denver office has to deal with several large and politically
difficult sites where the community surrounding these sites has reacted
precisely as did the citizens in the fictitious town of Purity. Further, the
author and other EPA Region VIII project managers have had the
misfortune of participating in a series of congressional hearings where the
same scenario portrayed in the MUSC panel discussion played itself out
over and over.' Accordingly, when the groundwater contamination
problem in Boulder was brought to EPA's attention, EPA decided it was the
perfect forum for an experiment in federal restraint.' Rather than get
trapped into the expensive and predictable pathway followed at so many
other sites, EPA decided to focus on two main themes that arose from the
Purity panels. Namely, EPA intended to use its authority to ensure that the
parties potentially responsible for the contamination would participate in
a community based decision making process. EPA also intended to help this
community take ownership of this project and the resulting decisions about
this project.' 6 In other words, EPA intended to facilitate the natural abilities
of the community to resolve this issue themselves.
Toward that end, EPA invited the major stakeholders to a meeting
on December 6,1994, to discuss EPA's involvement in the groundwater
investigation and the potential options available for this project. The
stakeholders are identified below.
The intent of the meeting was to provide the warning from EPA
with which many of the parties were already familiar: "You are a

54. See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-35 (1993).
55. The EPA staff initially assigned to this project were: Brian J. Pinkowski, Joseph
Santareila, Victor Ketellapper, and Karen Kellen. Several others eventually became part of
the team by the time the Vice President's Reinventing Government Award was presented.
56. The terms "community" and "stakeholders" include all parties who live, work, or
govern in the area near the site, and have some interest in the outcome of any public service
provided by the government related to the site. The term "financial stakeholders' refers to
those parties who may be potentially responsible for the contamination under federal law
and is used to distinguish potentially responsible parties (PRPs) from residents (or citizens).
"Residents" or "Citizens' refers to those members of the community that live or own
businesses in or near the site.
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potentially responsible party and will be facing substantial environmental
liability issues at a Superfund site." The meeting was also intended to put
the parties on notice that they had an opportunity to take a different type
of approach at this site.
The major stakeholders invited to this meeting were:
1. The City of Boulder was invited because of its association
with the Boulder County Fire Training Center and because
of its access to treated drinking water. 7 The City was also
important because of its role in the future development of
the North Boulder Area.
The Fire Training Center was used by the City of Boulder,
Boulder County, and several other surrounding
jurisdictions for training fire fighters. The Center would
spread mixed oil and solvents over mockups of buildings,
bum the mixture, and put the fires out. The facility would
then be washed down with water which was later trapped
in an unlined soil impoundment, 15 to 25 feet above the
water table, upgradient of the residential area relying on
the aquifer as a drinking water supply.' Both the City and
County were on the Board of Directors for the Fire
Training Center, in addition to both collecting bum
material and using the facility."
2. Boulder County was also included as a stakeholder
because of its activities at the Fire Training Center and for
its operation of a vehicle maintenance facility. The
maintenance facility had been in use for several decades
and historically had used solvents for cleaning vehicle
parts.' The County Health Department had identified its
facility as a suspected contamination source upgradient of
the affected community.61
3. The Colorado Department of Transportation vehicle
maintenance facility was also identified by BCHD as a
suspected source upgradient of the affected community.
The CDOT facility had been in operation for more than 40
57. Letter from Sue Ellen Harrison, Assistant City Attorney, City of Boulder, Colo., to
Maureen O'Reilly, Enforcement Specialist, US. EPA. (October 26,1994) (on file with author).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Letter from Dan Hershman, Manager, Road Maintenance Division Boulder County,
to Brian Pinkowski, Project Manager, U.S. EPA (October 26,1994) (on file with author).
61. See supra note 19.
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years by CDOT and, before then, the Colorado National
Guard.u
4. Centerline was invited to participate as a stakeholder
because of the
initial investigatory work linking them with
3
the plume.
5. Cencorp was invited to participate because of their
management involvement with Centerline prior to the
formation of Cencorp as a separate corporate entity."
6. The remaining major stakeholders to be invited were the
citizens themselves. From EPA's perspective, it was
important to include the residents in the development of
any remedy for this area because the citizens would
ultimately have to live with the solution. Since many of the
citizens had already organized for the lawsuit, their
attorney was invited to attend the meeting as their
representative.
At the December 6 meeting EPA talked with the group about why
each of them had been invited. The group was also told that EPA was
concerned about the contamination in the drinking water supply because
the nature and extent of contamination was unknown.' Thus, a significant
groundwater investigation could be necessary, resulting in a substantial
investment of time and money on the part of all of the parties, except the
residents.
EPA also helped the stakeholder group understand the decision
they faced by explaining the primary approaches available to the federal
government if the stakeholders decided against developing and
implementing a solution outside of EPA's direction.
The most common approach for EPA at projects such as this is to
score the site with a hazard ranking system model (HRS) in preparation for
the National Priorities List. The Hazard Ranking System is a simple
mathematical model that uses information about a site to produce a
numerical result, or score." If the score is 28.5 or greater, the site qualifies
for the National Priorities List. The National Priorities List (NPL) is a list of

62. Letter from Kenneth M. Gambril, Manager, Office of Environmental Services,
Colorado Department of Transportation, to Brian Pinkowski, Project Manager, U.S. EPA
(October 28,1994) (on file with author).
63. See supranote 27.
64. See supra note 49. See also Letter from Ronald R. Snyder, Dovatron International, to
Brian Pinkowski, Project Manager, U.S. EPA (July 28,1994) (on file with author).
65. Author's notes (on file with author).
66. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1993).
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hazardous waste sites compiled by EPA, which are priorities for agency
attention.' 7 Once a site is on the NPL, commercial and residential
development in the area is hindered because people fear the extensive
liability scheme under CERCLA.65
Once a site is on the NPL and EPA undertakes response actions, the
cost of a private party's involvement ( i.e. transaction costs) goes70 up
dramatically.69 Private parties are also exposed to staggering liability.
One of the costs would be for an investigation of the nature and
extent of the contamination. The author's experience with groundwater
investigations suggests that an investigation in North Boulder would cost
more than $500,000 due to the uncertainty of the source, the number of
potential sources identified by the BCHD, the complexity of the
hydrogeology, and the sheer size of the area.
After an investigation is completed, a set of alternatives is proposed
to resolve the problem and a selection of remedy is made in a final Agency
decision document or Record of Decision (ROD).' It takes 10 to 12 years to
get to a ROD on a site.' It takes several more years to actually manage the
cleanup."
The cost of a remedy involving treatment of the groundwater
would be expensive. A rule of thumb for groundwater cleanup is $1,000,000
per gallon of material escaped into the aquifer.74 It was very uncertain how
much material had escaped into this aquifer in North Boulder due to the
historical land use in the area.
After going over the implications of a traditional Superfund
groundwater investigation, EPA suggested that the parties may have had
solutions available to them that were not available to the federal
government. They were invited to explore alternatives and come back to
EPA with a solution. EPA also gave them three specific criteria to meet as
they came up with a proposal for EPA's approval.'

67. Id.
68. See, e.g., How Lender Liability Under SuperfundAffects Small Business: Hearingson H.R.
2085 Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (testimony of
Glenn L. Unterberger, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Waste, Office of Enforcement &
Compliance Monitoring, EPA).
69. See supra notes 2, 5, and 6.
70. Id.
71. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1990) (describes EPA's obligation to prepare a ROD
documenting the final remedy selection).
72. H.R. REP. No. 103-35, at 136 (1993).
73. Id.
74. Author's estimate.
75. Author's comments to Stakeholders" group at December 6,1994 meeting in Denver,
Colo.
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" Develop a community-based solution by March 15,1995,
" Begin implementation within seven months,
" Keep the use of EPA resources to a minimum. 6
V. HOW THE PARTIES PROCEEDED
During the December 6 meeting, several of the stakeholders argued
that they were not responsible for the groundwater contamination and saw
no reason for their involvement. To ensure their participation, EPA
reminded the parties that there was no technical information available to
rebut the Health Department suspicions that spilling had occurred at all of
the stakeholders' properties in the area. When met with further argument
by the parties, EPA offered to undertake an investigation at each of the
properties to see if any releases had actually occurred. The parties
understood that such an action would result in time and money being spent
by EPA. EPA would then be obligated to seek cost recovery from the
parties. Further investigation was also likely to reveal contamination
associated with all of the financial stakeholders' properties. All of this
would take time, perhaps years, and not move the group any closer to a
solution for the contaminated drinking water.
EPA redirected the discussion by reiterating its belief that the
stakeholders had alternatives to the approaches described above if the
parties worked together. EPA also stated its eagerness to consider such
alternatives. The message to the parties was clear: "Either you figure out
how to solve this problem, or EPA will be obliged to take the job."
This choice goes to the heart of the messages raised in the MUSC
panel discussions. The community members in the MUSC panel including
local government, business and residents often felt excluded from EPA's
decision making process. In North Boulder, EPA forced the community to
make a conscious choice as to the role the community would like for the
federal government on a local issue.
The stakeholders recognized that they had significant interests in
resolving this matter with as little help as possible from EPA. EPA left the
stakeholders to talk among themselves, but told them that they would be
expected to make a decision within a week as to their willingness to resolve
the groundwater problem. Although the parties did not organize to the
point where a single representative responded to the agency, each of the
parties individually agreed with EPA to work with the others to resolve this
issue.

76. id.
77. This section is told entirely from the author's perspective as the EPA Project
Manager.
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Despite their stated willingness to work together, the initial
discussions between the parties progressed quite slowly. The City of
Boulder professed no liability whatsoever associated with the groundwater
contamination and was resistant to participating in the dialog. The County
and the Colorado Department of Transportation were also reluctant.
Centerline demurred as well, pointing out that they were in the
middle of a lawsuit regarding the groundwater contamination and were
concerned about their appearance to resolve those issues before trial.
Cencorp and Centerline were both defendants in the lawsuit by the
residents. However, Cencorp had settled out as a result of a mediation
effort that had taken place. Naturally, Cencorp was not eager to participate
in any further activities related to the groundwater contamination. They
believed that they had paid whatever monies were necessary to extricate
themselves from this situation and were resistant to the prospect of
extensive liability under Superfund as well as any further involvement.
Cencorp insisted that the settlement money be used by the residents toward
the development of the groundwater solution. From Cencorp's perspective,
they had paid their settlement money to be used toward the resolution of
the ground water issue.
The citizens appeared unwilling to commit any of the funds that
they had received in settlement from Cencorp toward a resolution of the
groundwater contamination issue. Instead, they wanted EPA to come in and
clean the aquifer. The residents, however, were concerned about the
potential impact on property values and the length of time anticipated with
EPA Superfund involvement.
Over the next several months, EPA worked with the parties as
closely as possible while keeping its actions within the three objectives.
EPA's first objective was restraint. EPA did not want to dictate the outcome
of the solution. EPA also did not wish to bias the discussions. It was EPA's
belief that the group would come up with the best solution under the
circumstances, and that they would develop a better, more site-specific
solution than EPA could at the federal level.
The stakeholders' initial view of EPA's approach varied. The
citizens were frustrated that EPA was not dictating the solution to the
private parties. They wanted government to "fix it." The City complained
to the other parties that EPA was extorting performance out of all the
parties. In contrast, Centerline was happy that EPA had offered the parties
a chance to resolve the situation without being dragged into a decade-long,
adversarial relationship with the agency.
From EPA's perspective, the community was being set up to resolve
the groundwater problem without the conflicts encountered in MUSC's
panel discussions. While the community worked on the groundwater issue,
EPA focused on creating the environment for this community to have all of
the necessary parties and resources to create a local solution to the problem.
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In part, this was accomplished by maintaining regular contact with all of the
parties, serving as an unbiased message courier while the parties struggled
to work out a solution.
EPA also emphasized that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR),
specifically mediation was available to this group as they struggled through
their disputes. The parties reacted to EPA's mediation suggestions in a
strange manner. Cencorp, Centerline and the citizens had already tried
mediation and did not believe further benefit could be gained. Additionally,
all of the parties reacted as if dispute resolution was unnecessary because
they were all "still talking" to each other on a relatively friendly basis.
It was apparent that they saw ADR as a formal process that
required preparation similar to going to trial. None of the parties wanted a
formal process to sidetrack the discussions. Part of their reluctance was
related to the timing of the trial and their apparent unwillingness to
negotiate with each other. Another part of the problem was that the
resources and energy of the parties were focussed on the litigation and not
on EPA.
Despite the fact that the parties were unwilling to be "sidetracked"
with ADR, the group took advantage of EPA as a de facto mediator.
Although EPA was unable to provide assurances for confidentiality, the
discussions with the individual parties often involved a sharing of
confidences with EPA. For its part, EPA did not break those confidences.'
Perhaps because EPA was not formally assigned the role of
mediator, the individual parties often revealed information that likely
would have not been shared with a formal mediator. Many conversations
between individual parties and EPA would digress to the point where the
parties were "tattling" on one another for things said between them. Rather
than attempting to "refocus" the individual parties, EPA would remain
neutral while encouraging the individual parties to continue to release their
frustrations. However, all of the individual parties were disciplined
professionals and conversations eventually came back on track with little
or no prompting from EPA.
The parties often called EPA to request that the agency use its
enforcement authority to bring a recalcitrant party "into line." The context
for these requests varied greatly. Some parties would delicately suggest
"while EPA can, of course, make up its own mind, EPA should consider the
use of enforcement tools to force the parties to cooperate." Some parties
would blatantly tell EPA that "the others" should be ordered to take certain
actions. EPA always refused to take sides in the individual disputes but
often acted as a go-between for the issues that developed.

78. The confidences which were shared with EPA were only those which clients had
authorized.
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The parties would describe to EPA the results of negotiations with
each other. Frequently, the independent summaries of negotiating sessions
would not match. When EPA concluded that the parties did not understand
each other's messages, EPA would act as a go-between, or "translator" to
help clear up the confusion.
On three separate occasions EPA called meetings involving some
subset of the larger group specifically for the purpose of insuring that
communications remained clear. The three occasions where the parties all
insisted that the messages communicated during negotiations were clear,
and the reconciliation of interest was potentially simple from EPA's view
yet out of reach of the parties, EPA called the parties together to take a more
assertive mediation role. On two of the three occasions, the disputes were
entirely related to the lawsuit matters, completely outside EPA's purview,
yet important to the parties' ability to reach agreement on the groundwater
contamination. Invariably, the parties were either misleading EPA or
themselves about the content of the information that they had exchanged.
This became obvious when several "offers" that supposedly were made
earlier ended up being made for the first time at the meetings where EPA
was in attendance and questioned the parties directly."
It also appeared that the attorneys had not clearly explained the
situation and risks to their clients. At one of the meetings where clients were
in attendance, there were a few looks of surprise on the clients' faces when
EPA explained the risks of environmental liability under Superfund if an
agreement were not reached. This was puzzling in light of the fact that
weekly discussions about Superfund liability had been going on among the
attorneys for several months.
On April 15,1995, five months after initially being called together
as a group by EPA, the stakeholders group came to an apparent agreement
and proposed a resolution to the ground water problem. They agreed that
water would be provided from the City of Boulder to all domestic water
users in the affected area. The City would develop an annexation plan for
the area and provide the engineering design and construction for the water
hook-up. The cost of the design and construction would be borne by the
stakeholders and amounted to about $700,000, an amount far below the
usual remedy costs at Superfund sites.
EPA congratulated the parties after this presentation was made and
all the parties left the meeting except for the citizen's representatives. The

79. For example:
EPA Question: 'How did you respond to X's offer of blab, blah?"
Answer: 'We have not heard that until now.'
X then jumps in to make the offer that they had told EPA about weeks
earlier.
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citizens wanted to discuss the possibility of EPA weighing in on the details
of the annexation plan.
However, in the middle of this discussion, there was a knock at the
door and the other stakeholders asked to meet with EPA to discuss a
problem that had just been revealed among the parties. The financial
stakeholders had agreed to a solution but had failed to agree on the
financial stake of each party. The parties had not, in fact, worked out an
agreement.
Knowing that the parties were close to an agreement but distracted
by their lawsuit in the first weeks of May, EPA agreed to extend the
deadline until two days after the scheduled trial date. EPA hoped that the
parties would reach settlement on the lawsuit and then quickly reach
resolution on the groundwater issue.
The residents and Centerline ultimately failed to reach settlement
and proceeded with the trial. The residents prevailed at court and went on
to reach an agreement on damages with Centerline."
However, with the lawsuit out of the way, the parties were able to
return their attention to EPA and the resolution of the groundwater
problem. All of the parties were able to agree on the idea that city water
would be provided to the residents. The residents, however, were not
happy with the annexation plans being proposed by the City. It quickly
became apparent that the residents were unable to pull together as a group
to decide on the details of implementation.
Nine months after the financial agreement had been reached, the
City annexed the streets in the area and began putting in water lines.
However, it has refused to allow residents to hook up to the City water
supply without individually annexing into the city.
Sixteen months after initially being contacted by EPA, the residents
do not have an alternative water supply and are still asking EPA to force the
City to provide water without annexation.
Despite their informal request for Agency assistance, the residents
have turned their attentions away from issues surrounding the health risks
presented by the water and the actual injuries that they claimed at trial due
to drinking the water. Instead, they have concentrated their energies on
maximizing protection of their individual land use concerns and
minimizing the restrictions that come with being annexed into the city. The
citizens have an alternative water supply available to them and are working
out the details for its delivery to their homes. They have placed the
apparent priority of their efforts on land use issues.

80. Centerline subrogated its claim against its insurance company to the residents. As
of this writing, the claim against the insurance company has not progressed significantly.
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The end result is that this community has resolved a drinking water
problem within 15 months of being contacted by EPA and for a cost of
approximately $700,000. Further, the driving forces behind the resolution
to this groundwater problem are almost entirely local. The process of
resolving this problem was far from painless; there will likely be some
continuing attention to the evolving terms of the annexation agreement.
Nonetheless, this project reflects local priorities and concerns and presents
a successful model to be used in other communities to minimize the
disempowerment concerns raised in the MUSC panel discussions.
VI. DISCUSSION
The first step in determining the characteristics of this project that
contributed to its success is to strip away many of the site-specific details
until just the critical underlying elements remain. It makes sense to start
with a description of the parties and their functional roles in resolving this
groundwater problem.
The Roles of the Parties
Residents
In North Boulder the citizens were organized for the purpose of the
lawsuit and had agreed to communicate with EPA through their attorney.
The issue of groundwater contamination had sufficient interest in the
community that the residents were able to draw together around it.
The cohesiveness of the residents acted as a catalyst for government
action. This is different than many communities where the citizens receive
information from the government but are not stirred to coalesce as a
community behind the issue. Unless the community is focussed on an issue,
the government usually spends a great deal of time trying to inform the
community into a state of manageable excitement. This seldom succeeds.
However, an apathetic response from a community is usually interpreted
as support for the government's proposed approach. In fact, the apathetic
response by a community is more precisely a tentative delegation of
authority to proceed. This authority can and often is withdrawn from the
government the moment a more interesting issue for the community arises.
Communities coalesce around an issue while it is important to them, then
dissolve their focus when the issue no longer demands their attention.
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The critical characteristics for the residents involved in this
agreement were that they had largely come to focus on the issue and had
empowered spokespersons.'
Corporate Community
The corporate community on this project was comprised of parties
with an interest in seeing the groundwater problem resolved. Centerline
and Cencorp were concerned about potential Superfund liability and it was
in their best financial interests to arrive at a quick solution. Centerline had
the additional concern regarding the outcome of the lawsuit. The Colorado
Department of Transportation had the same financial interests as the
corporate stakeholders.
Thus, the critical characteristics of the corporate community
involved in this agreement were their clear financial interests. Obviously,
the personality and values of the corporate leadership can play a role, but
a financial interest is consistently compelling. The interests and needs of
municipalities, however, is a more complex matter.
Municipal Governments
Boulder County had the combined interest of protecting the health
of the people in their jurisdiction and the financial interest of minimizing
potential Superfund liability. Their behavior throughout the entire process
was focused primarily on solving the health risk problems and not the
financial liability issues. Given the potential magnitude of their financial
liability under Superfund, the County's ability to remain focussed on health
issues was admirable.
The City of Boulder was the party most responsible for making this
agreement come together. Granted, the City's potential Superfund liability
was the prime motivator to bring them to the table. However, once they had
committed themselves to participating in the stakeholder's group, their
leadership kept the group focussed on the goal of getting an
uncontaminated water supply to the residents.
Thus, the critical characteristics of the municipalities involved in
this agreement were their sense of commitment to the welfare of the
residents. This is what all municipalities are "supposed" to be focused on,
but experience reveals that the commitment of municipalities to a politically
difficult and high risk process is not always decided by citizen welfare

81. The only way to test for these characteristics is indirectly through a subtle
sociological observation process. Unfortunately, this process is beyond the scope of this
essay.
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issues. This is especially true when several corporate constituents are
exposed to significant liability. Many municipalities will either "lie in the
weeds" -staying uninvolved and complaining that another party is more
appropriate to address the problem-or make an audible display of
concern, but take no action and commit no resources to the issue. Thus, a
municipality's commitment to resolving the problem is a significant
characteristic of a successful environment for problem solving.
The Federal Role
The chief characteristic of the federal agency involved in this
agreement was a dogged commitment to seeing this community resolve the
problem on its own. In fact, this is the single most important characteristic
of a successful government facilitation effort. If an agency is unclear about
its willingness to allow a community to resolve its own problems, the
community is doomed to become mired in bureaucracy.
The agency's dedication to this goal helped increase the creativity
of EPA staff in finding ways to assist the parties in overcoming obstacles.
The type of other projects that this approach may apply to is limited
only by the imagination of the federal government. Any place that the
federal government has the traditional role of being final decision-maker
could benefit from this hands-off approach. The spotted owl controversy in
the Northwest could have benefited from this approach. Certainly, the
parties "on the ground" in the spotted owl issue had sufficient knowledge
to develop a solution which addressed all of the interests. However, they
probably did not have sufficient resources and authority. Hence, the need
for federal involvement. The spotted owl controversy was a controversy
because it was more complex than merely the preservation of a species. It
involved preservation of a timber culture in the United States that has been
present for many generations of families. It also involved corporate
financial interests. Only by bringing the proper groups together to deal with
the specific interests of all the parties can progress be made. 2
A perfect example of facilitative government gone awry can be
found in Interior Secretary Babbit's Rangeland Reform Initiative in 1993 and
1994. Secretary Babbit fostered the development of local working groups to
address issues of public lands use. These groups were comprised of
environmentalists, ranchers, recreational public land users, and others in
and around specific public lands. Several of these groups developed
rangeland proposals that were workable for the surrounding communities

82. The spotted owl controversy could have been a candidate for facilitative government
because it has the proper elements in place. However, I am not criticizing the approach that
was taken or its outcome.
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and interests, only to have the Department of Interior reject the solutions in
the end. The Interior Department had not been committed to empowering
the local communities to solve their own problems.
There are some practical problems with the facilitative government
approach. First, it is difficult to measure success. Is success to be measured
by the construction of some item or dollars saved? What benchmark do you
use to measure dollars saved? Perhaps success should be measured by the
ambiguous measures associated with communities taking more ownership
and responsibility for local environmental issues.
Another issue of no small importance to the federal government is
the question of resources. How can an agency budget for facilitative
government projects? Are full time mediators a valid measure of
budgeting? Perhaps, but it becomes more difficult to understand how many
mediators might be necessary on a project when you don't know the project
exists and the end result of a successful project may be nothing more than
a more active and responsible community. These issues are certainly
resolvable, but most budget people like hard measures of resources and
budgets. Congress is no different.
VII. CONCLUSION
The primary characteristics of a problem that would be amenable
to a facilitative approach is that the federal government actually wants to
let a community reach its own solutions, and is willing to resist the
numerous opportunities to direct the outcome of the community's decisionmaking process. This can be frustrating for the agency and the community.
This also runs contrary to our cultural tendencies of elevating issues to the
next higher authority at the first sign of conflict.
When EPA is called into a community, they typically assume the
role of final decision-makers. In the North Boulder case, EPA literally forced
the community to resolve this problem on their own. It remains to be seen
whether the solution reached by this community will provide comfort for
all the parties, but it is their solution and not a solution imposed by the
federal government. Certainly the annexation agreement to be worked out
between the residents and the City will be difficult due to the independent
nature of this community and the history of annexation in the area. Despite
these difficulties the community will be entirely in control of the outcome.
EPA's role was merely to ensure that the proper parties were brought
together with sufficient interest in resolving the groundwater issue.
Some of the residents questioned whether EPA had fulfilled its
responsibility. In its worst light, EPA failed to clean the groundwater and
failed to provide safe drinking water to the residents. EPA effectively did
nothing.
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On the other hand, if EPA had taken steps to treat the groundwater,
millions of dollars would have been spent over many years, with no
guarantee that the residents would receive drinking water without
annexation. Further, if EPA had ordered the City to provide water to this
area, years of litigation would most certainly have ensued.
As it turned out, EPA forced all the parties in the community,
including the citizens, to accept some responsibility for resolving this
situation. All the parties had a hand in developing the package that would
provide safe drinking water to the residents in North Boulder.
EPA was able to facilitate a community based environmental
decision by using its authority to make sure the appropriate parties in the
community would participate. It's uncertain that the North Boulder
problem would have come together if EPA had not been able to hold parties
accountable. Thus, the current threat of Congress to diminish the liability
scheme may have the unintended effect of destroying incentives for
corporate citizens to work as problem solving partners in their
communities. If Congress removes the liability scheme under CERCLA,
then corporate America will have one less reason to feel part of and
responsible to the communities that surround it.
Perhaps the personality mix on the North Boulder project team
allowed for this informal agency approach where it may not otherwise be
tenable. However, the success of the approach in North Boulder suggests
that the federal government and EPA in particular should explore the
potential for a role as facilitator in communities rather than merely the
dominating outside expert.
Overall, this project has been a success to date. The residents have
safe drinking water available to them and the overall expenditure of
resources by all parties has been relatively small. The primary question
presented in this essay is whether the federal government can successfully
facilitate the natural talents and decision-making capabilities of
communities. In North Boulder, the answer was "yes." The answer on many
other projects is also likely to be "yes."
In North Boulder, EPA discovered that communities could handle
environmental issues with federal facilitation available as assistance.
Hopefully the government's role as facilitator will be experimented with by
other agencies in the future.

